Kandy, Sri Lanka
Current project - To campaign, protest, or fight? Ethnic minority strategies under the shadow of ethnic political majority fragmentation
How does fragmentation politically advantaged ethnic groups - i.e., ethnically mobilized groups that control the government - impact whether organizations representing ethnic minority groups use violence, nonviolence, or electoral politics to achieve their political goals? A large literature has shown that fragmentation within politically disadvantaged ethnic groups affects the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use. And yet ethnic mobilization and fragmentation are not unique to ethnic minorities.
In some countries, like Serbia, Israel, Burundi, India, and Sri Lanka, ethnic identity may be just as politically salient for the groups who control the government as it is for the ethnic minorities who challenge their rule, with many co-ethnic parties who represent the politically dominant ethnic group vying for control of the government. In other countries, like the United States, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, and Sweden, ethnic identity and mobilization within the majority group is on the rise.
Given that fragmentation within ethnic political minority groups has been shown to impact the strategies of ethnic minority organizations, it is reasonable to expect that fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the government may likewise condition these choices.
In this project, I develop and test a theory about how fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the government - i.e., politically advantaged ethnic groups - conditions the choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence. I define politically advantaged ethnic groups as those who control the executive branch of government and are represented primarily by ethnic parties who compete for the same base of ethnic support. I conceptualize that when these groups are minimally fragmented, there are fewer divisions in the preferences and policy positions of co-ethnic parties and that one party dominates over others. Under higher levels of fragmentation, parties representing the politically dominant ethnic group are more divided in their preferences and policy positions, and two or more co-ethnic parties may be relatively equal in power.
I argue that fragmentation within the politically advantaged ethnic group affects the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence. Higher levels of fragmentation create opportunities for minority organizations to serve as cross-ethnic coalition members via electoral politics and to leverage elite divisions with nonviolence, neither of which are present when politically advantaged ethnic groups are minimally fragmented. In contrast, lower levels of fragmentation increase the ability of organizations to use violence effectively, as using violence against a highly fragmented ethnic group is likely to lead to outbidding dynamics that can make a government more resolved and harder to defeat with force. As such, I expect that minority organizations are more likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics when fragmentation is relatively low, and that nonviolence and elections are more likely than violence when fragmentation is relatively high.
I test this argument with original data on politically advantaged ethnic group fragmentation in combination with existing data on the use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence by minority organizations in Sri Lanka from 1960-2005. To measure fragmentation, I use legislative roll call voting data collected during field research in Sri Lanka and information about ethnic party seat share. In the analysis, I find strong support for the theory; on average and controlling for various factors, as fragmentation increases from its lowest to highest levels, ethnopolitical minority organizations are (1) more likely to engage in electoral politics by 14 percentage points, (2) more likely to use nonviolence by 13 percentage points, and (3) less likely to use violence by 12 percentage points.
This study contributes to a fundamental question in conflict studies - why do some organizations use violence to pursue their political goals, whereas others eschew force and engage in nonviolence or electoral politics? Building on the literature about tactical choice in conflict, which has focused on factors within ethnic political minority groups or states, I show that ethnic factors within the state - i.e., fragmentation within politically mobilized ethnic groups that control the government - also influence minority strategies. This research also complements and advances studies on elite divisions in social movements and nonviolent resistance, as well as the literature on horizontal inequalities, by focusing on elite divisions within an important actor against whom ethnic minority organizations may need to press their political demands - politically advantaged ethnic groups that control the government.
How does fragmentation politically advantaged ethnic groups - i.e., ethnically mobilized groups that control the government - impact whether organizations representing ethnic minority groups use violence, nonviolence, or electoral politics to achieve their political goals? A large literature has shown that fragmentation within politically disadvantaged ethnic groups affects the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use. And yet ethnic mobilization and fragmentation are not unique to ethnic minorities.
In some countries, like Serbia, Israel, Burundi, India, and Sri Lanka, ethnic identity may be just as politically salient for the groups who control the government as it is for the ethnic minorities who challenge their rule, with many co-ethnic parties who represent the politically dominant ethnic group vying for control of the government. In other countries, like the United States, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, and Sweden, ethnic identity and mobilization within the majority group is on the rise.
Given that fragmentation within ethnic political minority groups has been shown to impact the strategies of ethnic minority organizations, it is reasonable to expect that fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the government may likewise condition these choices.
In this project, I develop and test a theory about how fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the government - i.e., politically advantaged ethnic groups - conditions the choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence. I define politically advantaged ethnic groups as those who control the executive branch of government and are represented primarily by ethnic parties who compete for the same base of ethnic support. I conceptualize that when these groups are minimally fragmented, there are fewer divisions in the preferences and policy positions of co-ethnic parties and that one party dominates over others. Under higher levels of fragmentation, parties representing the politically dominant ethnic group are more divided in their preferences and policy positions, and two or more co-ethnic parties may be relatively equal in power.
I argue that fragmentation within the politically advantaged ethnic group affects the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence. Higher levels of fragmentation create opportunities for minority organizations to serve as cross-ethnic coalition members via electoral politics and to leverage elite divisions with nonviolence, neither of which are present when politically advantaged ethnic groups are minimally fragmented. In contrast, lower levels of fragmentation increase the ability of organizations to use violence effectively, as using violence against a highly fragmented ethnic group is likely to lead to outbidding dynamics that can make a government more resolved and harder to defeat with force. As such, I expect that minority organizations are more likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics when fragmentation is relatively low, and that nonviolence and elections are more likely than violence when fragmentation is relatively high.
I test this argument with original data on politically advantaged ethnic group fragmentation in combination with existing data on the use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence by minority organizations in Sri Lanka from 1960-2005. To measure fragmentation, I use legislative roll call voting data collected during field research in Sri Lanka and information about ethnic party seat share. In the analysis, I find strong support for the theory; on average and controlling for various factors, as fragmentation increases from its lowest to highest levels, ethnopolitical minority organizations are (1) more likely to engage in electoral politics by 14 percentage points, (2) more likely to use nonviolence by 13 percentage points, and (3) less likely to use violence by 12 percentage points.
This study contributes to a fundamental question in conflict studies - why do some organizations use violence to pursue their political goals, whereas others eschew force and engage in nonviolence or electoral politics? Building on the literature about tactical choice in conflict, which has focused on factors within ethnic political minority groups or states, I show that ethnic factors within the state - i.e., fragmentation within politically mobilized ethnic groups that control the government - also influence minority strategies. This research also complements and advances studies on elite divisions in social movements and nonviolent resistance, as well as the literature on horizontal inequalities, by focusing on elite divisions within an important actor against whom ethnic minority organizations may need to press their political demands - politically advantaged ethnic groups that control the government.